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In this paper we derive optimal stockpiling policies for
an economy that faces an embargo threat with respect to
essential resources. The properties of the optimal program
depend crucially on the access of this country to a perfect
capital market and on the factor allocation in embargo
periods. This paper is similar to Bergstrom/Loury/Persson
(1985) but in contrast to them focuses on the relationship of
stockpiling to domestically produced resources and on the use
of these resources as an input in production.
1. Introduction
Commodity stockpiling has been for a long time a subject
of policy discussion. In the aftermath of the two oil crises,
efforts has been taken to stockpile oil and other resources
to protect the economy against future supply disruptions.
Given a positive probability of future increases in the price
of oil or resources, private actors have an incentive to
stockpile in order to get arbitrage returns. For a large
Research leading to this paper was supported by the
"Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" (SFB 178) and that
support is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank
Bernd Fitzenberger, Jesko Hentschel, Bert Hofman, Ernst
Mohr, Michael Rauscher, Horst Siebert and Timothy Worrall
for helpful comments.importing country with market power, there is an additional
incentive for public storage since the marginal social
benefits are higher than the market price for oil. Those
macroeconomic externalities that are not reflected in the
market price may result from wage and price rigidities.
To our mind the policy of stockpiling succeded in the
times after Iraq intervention. The western world held
reserves of oil for about 100 days. Although the cut in
supply was the same as during the iranian revolution, price
increases was half.
This paper is similar to Bergstrom/Loury/Persson (1985)
and Loury (1983), but in contrast to them focuses primarily
on the relationship of stockpiling to domestically produced
resources and on the use of resources as an input in produc-
tion. Problems of trade disruptions have also been discussed
in Dasgupta/Heal (1974), Hoel (1978), Arad/Hillman (1979),
Dasgupta/Stiglitz (1981) and Hillman/Long (1983). What makes
our analysis different from theirs is that they assume that
once an embargo (new technology) has been imposed it will
last forever. In contrast, we assume that periods of free
trade and embargoes alternate. The attempt of this paper is
to develop optimal stockpiling policies, considering the
influence of perfect and non-perfect capital markets and
derive comparative-state results.
2. The Model
We consider an economy that can import a flow of resources
R at a world market price p* when there is free trade. Free
trade is ocassionally interrupted by embargos, in which R
imp
0 . From the point of view of this economy it is not
known, when an embargo will be imposed, nor, when it will
end. The country uses a part, R
f of the imported resources
as an input in the production of F, a consumption good. The
rest of the imported resources, R
s = R
imp - R
f , are stock-piled. Here we neglect the existence of storage costs. In the
case of an embargo, the country will run down its stock with
the rate R
e . The stock at hand at time t is denoted as Sc .
The model of this paper uses a continous time framework.
The time index is omitted when there is no ambiguity. As



















The country pays for its imports by exporting its final
good Y at the price p
7 . For the moment it is assumed that no
capital market exists. The implication of a perfect capital
market will be discussed later in this paper. In times of
free trade all sectors of the economy are assumed to be in
competition with foreign firms, so that the terms of trade
p := p* / p
7 cannot be influenced. In times of trade disrup-
tions, p
7 remains exogenous, but p* will now be determined
domestically. The production of the final good Y is carried
out by a profit-maximizing firm under conditions of perfect
competition. The technology of production F is assumed to be
neoclassical, i.e. f is linear homogenous and has the usual
properties of neoclassical production functions.
Y = F ( K' , L , R^ ) , (3)
where K
y is the capital used in the production of the
final good. The supply of labor L is fixed. The resources R
7
used in the production process consist of imported resources
R
f and domestically produced resources R
d . In the case of
an embargo domestically produced resources are supplemented
by resources from the reserve R
e . For simplicity it is as-sumed that no labor is used in the production of the domestic
resource.
Regime: Free Trade Embargo
K = R
7 + K







K , L = exogenous and fixed (5)
R^ = R
f + R




d = G ( K
d ) , (7)
where G' > 0 , G" < 0 , G(0)= 0
and lim G" = «.
K
d -*• 0




where C denotes domestic consumption. Note that R
f is
assumed to be positive, to ensure that the country remains a
resource-importing country for all time. The country in
question is assumed to have a social welfare function U which
depends only on consumption and has the usual properties.
U = U ( C ) , with U - > 0 , U " - < 0 ,
U ( 0 ) = 0 , (9)
and lim U" = «>.
C -> 0
This assumption of infinite marginal utility ensures
positive consumption in each period and avoid the necessity
of a "minimum-subsistance" constraint. The utility function
implies that society is risk avers. It is assumed that the
private sector does not anticipate embargoes, so that no
assumptions need to be made about their risk preferences.
This is a very strong assumption, but without it the factorallocation in times of free trade would be influenced and so
the effect of stockpiling might be superimposed.
In the long run we assume that periods of free trade
alternate with times of embargoes in infinite sequence.
Periods of free trade and embargoes are governed by a two-
state Markov process { xt } . The state xc - 0 represents an
embargo, and the state xc = l free trade. Let aQ denote the
probability that the regime changes from embargo to free
trade independent of time. Then the duration zQ of an
embargo is exponentially distributed with the parameter aQ









where E ( zQ ) •= 1 / aQ , and var ( zQ ) = 1 / aQ
2 . The
same holds for the probability distribution in times of free
trade. Let a1 be the probability that the regime changes
from free trade to embargo, then the duration zx of free
trade is likewise exponentially distributed, with the density
function f1 .
f j ( z; ) = ai exp ( -a, z, ). (11)
Let V ( x ; S , ¥?x ) be the optimal expected present
value of welfare under free trade ( x = 1 ) and under an




Therefore, with an embargo in effect, and with v as the
social preference rate, optimal stockpiling policy implies:
K
E. does not denote a variable, but generally denotes the
allocation of factors.V ( 0; S, K* ) = max
R
e a0 exp ( -a
exp ( -vt ) U ( C ) dt










e ) = F ( K - K
d , L , R
e + G ( K
d ) )
In times of free trade optimal stockpiling implies
V ( 1; S, K^ ) = max a1 exp





exp ( -vZj ) V ( 0; S ( Zj ), K^ ) } dZj
R
s dt
f ( K^ ) - p (R
s + R
f)
K^ ( private behaviour )
-P!& arise from the first order conditions of profit maxi-
mizing behaviour. Note that in times of free trade the
allocation of factors is not influenced by the stock-policy.
Let r denote the nominal interest rate of capital, and w the
nominal wage rate, it follows:
3 (i) r - p




7 F3 • And for the resource producing firm: (iv)
r = p
R G ". It follows that:
F,
(v) —^ = F3
In times of free trade the ratio of marginal capital
productivities from capital in different uses equals the
marginal productivity of resources used in the production of
the consumption good.
3. Optimal Stockpiling in the Absence of a Perfect Capital
Market
We are now able to determine optimal stockpiling policy.
The results depend crucially on the factor allocation in
periods of embargoes and on the market structure, since this
influences the marginal utility that is gained by running
down the stock. That again drives optimal stock policy in
embargo periods and even in times of free trade. To analyse
which marginal utility can be gained from a marginal deple-








The subscript denotes the partial derivative of the
function F with respect to the i-th argument. In the
analysis that follows, a dot above a variable denotes its
partial derivative with respect to time.So in times of embargoes, three cases can be distin-
guished, that can serve as points of reference: (a) The
factor adjustment goes with infinite speed and the domestic
resource industry gains no monopoly power in times of supply
disruptions. Here is F3 G~ - Fx = 0 for each point of
time, and the marginal utility that can be gained from an
additional unit of the stock comes only from its effect in
the production of the final good Y . (b) The factor adjust-
ment speed is infinite but the domestic resource industry
gains monopolistic power in the embargo, meaning that F3 G~
- F2 > 0 . Up to the point of an efficient allocation of
capital, running down the stock yields additional marginal
utility, because it improves the monopoly situation, (c) If
the adjustment is lagged, then again F3 G~ - FJ > 0,
but also dl? / dR
e = 0 . Now running down the stock will not
induce a more efficient factor allocation. To improve the
situation in this case, other instruments (taxes or tariffs)
have to be used.
Integrating by parts, ( A " ) can be written as:
V ( 0; S, K




{ U ( C ) + a0 V ( 1; Sc , K^ ) }






, C, V 1 , v > 0The Hamiltonian gives us the first order conditions:
4
R° = U * { C ( K*o , R
e ) } F3 ( K
E0 , R
e ) (12)
JV = ( v + a
What follows is:
0 ) Bc° - a0 Vs ( 1; Sc , K*; ) (13)
Se
R° R t
where R^ is the costate-variable for V ( 1 ; ). (12) is
the usual result.
5 The shadow price R° of the resource
should equal the marginal utility of an additional resource
depletion. (14) reminds to the well known Hotelling-Rule.
6
The expected rate of price increase of resources in the stock
should equal the social discount rate v. The expected rate of
price increase if an embargo is still going on at date t ,
consists of the rate of shadow price increase R° I R° and
the expected marginal gain from stockpiling if an embargo
will end in the next instant, where aQ is the probability
for that to happen. Vs ( 1; Sc , K
E1 ) gives the marginal
valuation of the stock at the time zQ . Now we turn to the
optimal policy in times of free trade, i.e. building up the
stock. Again integrating by parts, it follows:




{ U ( C ) + a; V ( 0; St , K
E0 ) }
0 exp { - ( v + a1 ) t } dt
s.t. dSc = R
s dt
Vs denotes the partial derivative of V ( ) with respect
to S. It is assumed that the Hamiltonian is concave in
the control and in the state variable ( i.e. D
2 H > 0 ).
That ensures that second order conditions are satisfied,
and that the saddle path of the optimal solution in the
state-costate-space is negatively sloped.
Here it was assumed that in embargo periods an efficient
allocation takes place.
Cf. Hotelling (193-1).10
( B ) C = C ( K
E2 , R
s )
First order conditions in times of free trade are:
dC
Rt* = - U




J = ( v + a, ) Rt
l - a, Vs ( 0; Sc , K
E0 ) (16)
What follows is:
vs ( 0;' St , K
E0 ) - Bt'
+ a. = v (17)
implies that at each point of time under free trade
one should balance marginal costs U~ p and marginal benefits
J3t
2 of stockpiling. (17) can be interpreted the same way as
(14). The social discount rate v should equal the expected
rate of price increase of the resources, that consists again
of the two components mentioned before. (12) and (15) show
that the optimal change of the stock in the respective regime
is an implicit function IF




f (fi/), with IF^ > ( < ) 0, for i = 1(0) (18)
It is easy to see that if (in embargo periods) the shadow
price B° rises, it becomes more costly to deplete the
stock, so the depletion rate R
e falls. In free trade, with
rising B^ it becomes less costly to fill the stock, and so
R
s rises. Together with (13) and (16) this yields two
systems of differential equations that specify optimal policy
in each regime. In embargo periods:
&c° = ( v + a0 ) R° - a0 Vs ( 1; Se , K^ ) (13)11
- IF
0 ( Bc° ), with IF°~ < 0 (18a)
And in free trade:
B + a, ) B/ 0; St
IF
J ( R




These equations determine the properties of the optimal
path. The path S° = 0 can only be associated with an
infinitely large R° . The path St
J = 0 can only be
associated with Bt
J = 0 . Under reasonable assumptions it
can be shown that the path B
 i = 0 is negatively sloped
and convex to the origin. If the systems (13) resp. (16) and










We see that det J ( ) = (-) IF^
1 a± Vss < 0 and trace
J ( ) = v + a± > 0, so the optimal path is a saddle path.
From these equations we obtain the phase diagram in the
state-costate space in times of embargoes:Figure 1:




For completeness, it must be noted that in order to get
the full solution it is necessary to combine the two problems
in the different regimes. Vs ( 0; St , K
E0 ) denotes the mar-Bibliothek
13 des Institute fur Weltwirtscha
ginal valuation of an additional unit in the stock, if the
times of free trade end. This expression should obviously be
equal to the initial shadow price J30° of the resource in this
regime. The same is true for V ( 1; S , K
E 1 ). This expres-
sion should equal the initial shadow price B0




 KEO ) = V (
2°)
Vs ( 1; St , K* ) = Bj (21)
In this model the long-run embargo steady-state is
associated with a zero stock and will only be reached in
infinite time and with zero probability. The path fo^ = 0
does not intersect the S - axis, because this would imply
that Vs ( 0 , . ) = 0. When an embargo is in place, the
country will be on the path "a". The stock is depleted with a
falling rate. When the the embargo ends and free trade comes,
the country jumps on the path "b" . The steady state in free
trade will only be reached with zero probability.
This implies the following for the stock-development: On
the optimal path "b" under free trade, the shadow price Bc
l
of not-building up the stock goes down, but with a falling
rate, i.e. in the first days of the free trade regime the
filling rate will be relatively high. The economy substitutes
consumption by security. As free trade continues, the amount
that is stockpiled is reduced. At some random date, an
embargo is imposed. So the economy jumps to the path "a", and
the stock is now depleted. As the embargo goes on, the
increase of the shadow price induces the economy to a
economically use of the resource. After a certain time the
embargo will end, and the process starts again. The develop-
ment of the stock might be the following:14
st A
Figure 3:
Turning to the comparative-dynamic properties of the
model, it is easy to see that the paths S
 1 = 0 are
invariant with regard to parameter variations. Therefore, we
have to look how the paths of the costate variables change if
the parameters of the system had changed.
a) If the expected duration of free trade is lengthened (
da1 < 0 ) , the economy expects to have more time to build
up the stock. The optimal filling rate R
s will go down and
the renunciation of consumption in each period doesn't have
to be as large as before. The shadow price B* of not-
filling up the stock, will go down, but the stock at hand at
the expected end of free trade will be higher. The reason for
that is, given a constant expected duration of the embargo,
it cannot be optimal that the economy in times of supply
disruptions won \ benefit from a relaxed restriction. So at
the expected begin of an embargo more resources will be
available and the marginal costs B ° of depleting the stock
will also go down. We can state: The more unlikely It Is that15
an embargo is to be imposed (da < 0 ) , the larger will be
the optimal expected stock.
b) If the expected duration of an embargo is lengthened (
da0 < 0 ) , the country has to be more careful with the
resources. A constraint is aggravated. Less resources per
unit of time are depleted from the stock. Consumption will go
down. Nevertheless, it must be optimal to take over a part of
the stronger restriction in times of free trade. So the opti-
mal filling rate in the free trade regime will go up. There-
fore, the more unlikely it is that an embargo expires ( daQ
< 0 ), the larger will be the optimal expected stock.
c) If the relative price of the resource rises ( dp > 0
), stockpiling is not as profitable as before. The economy is
induced to expand domestic production of the resource and the
resource imports in times of free trade will go down.
4. Optimal Stockpiling with Perfect Capital Markets
Up to now we have assumed that the economy in question has
no access to a capital market, on which they can borrow, for
example to finance the stock of resources. This is rather
restrictive and can serve as a frame of reference. In
reality, the economy might be able to encumber with debt. If
we assume perfect capital markets, one constraint is suspen-
ded, namely that building up the stock is associated with
postponing of consumption. But now a new constraint becomes
relevant, namely that after some time debt must be repaid.
Again this implies an intertemporal shift in consumption.
In the presence of perfect capital markets, the "Fisher-
Separation-Theorem" allows us to devide the problem into two
parts. The stock-policy can now be separated from the
decision how to finance it. It is a standard result
7 that it
Cf. Siebert (1988).16
is optimal for the country to fill the stock immediately to
its optimal level S* after the embargo has expired. In com-
parison with the case of no capital market, the development
of the stock might be the following way:
st
Figure 4:
The comparative-dynamics are straightforward, if we go
back to (16) and note that in this case h^ 0 . It
follows:
a) If the expected duration of free trade goes up ( da2 <
0 ) the optimal stock will be smaller, because an embargo is
less likely. So at the begin of an embargo, there are less
resources at hand, and thus the shadow price B ° rises. As
soon as the embargo ends, the stock is again at the optimal
level, 3
1 remains constant. So the more likely it is that
an embargo is to be imposed ( da1 < 0 ), the smaller will
be an optimal stock. This is the crucial difference to the
case without perfect capital markets. The reason is, that now
it is possible to invest a surplus on the capital market
(that surplus may arise, if free trade goes on longer than
expected). Without perfect capital markets an intertemporal
shift in consumption was only possible by stockpiling.17
b) If the expected duration of an embargo is lengthened (
da0 < 0 ), the non-capital-market result holds. The more
unlikely it Is that an embargo expires ( daQ < 0 ), the
larger will be the optimal stock.
c) For an exogenous rising price {dp > 0 ), the optimal
stock goes down.
d) The world interest rate influences the size of the
optimal stock, because this is the price for debt. It is
obvious that, the higher the interest rate on the world
capital market, the smaller the optimal stock.
5. Concluding Comments
If an economy faces an embargo threat with respect to
essential resources, the success of policy instruments depend
crucially on the speed of adjustment of the factors and the
degree of market power that arises in the domestic resource
industry in times of supply disruptions. As a frame of
reference three cases can be distinguished: a) The factor
adjustment speed is infinite and the domestic resource
industry gains no market power. This "neoclassical vision"
occures when there are many small resource producing firms in
the home country, b) The factor adjustment speed is infinite
but the domestic resource industry gains some monopolistic
power in embargo times. A inefficient factor allocation
results. This is not desirable, because this profit incentive
will not induce the domestic resource industry to produce
more resources. Monopoly theory shows that in this case the
movement of capital is too low, and thus the supply of
domestically produced resources is too low. c) The factor
adjustment is lagged or will not take place at all.
In the first two cases stockpiling is an efficient instru-
ment for managing embargo threats. The knowledge of possible18
supply disruptions is fully exploited. In the second case, a
stock will yield an additional effect. Namely stock depletion
in embargo periods will reduce the market power of the
domestic resource producing firm. Economic losses from a
monopoly position will be reduced. Capital is induced to move
in its more efficient use. If the factor adjustment is
hindered, depleting the stock gives indeed a high marginal
utility, but does not force a more efficient allocation. Here
the policy should provide incentives for factor movements.
If we give up the small country assumption, our arguments
gain strength. Stockpiling becomes a more efficient instru-
ment, since the larger demand for resources in times of free
trade, increases the price of the resource (like it would
after a tariff has been levied) and so it promotes conserva-
tion of the resource in times of free trade. In the case of
an embargo the stock is depleted and price increases are
reduced. Stockpiling can serve as an "automatic stabilizer".
Tariffs and taxes normally go hand in hand with a in-
efficient allocation of factors. In the case of stockpiling
these undesired consequences are avoided. Beyond it, it
becomes possible to reduce the losses in efficiency due to
monopoly power.
In this model we have derived properties of optimal stock
management. The question arises, who should do this, the
private sector or the government. The answer has obviously to
do with externalities.
8 Without externalities the private
sector should be able to hold a socially optimal stock. If
external effects arise due to monopolistic power in embargo
periods, or due to asymmetric information, governmental
intervention is required. This can be done by a government
owned resource stock, with which they compete with private
firms in times of supply disruptions. Alternatively, this can
be done by law, but then the impact on the incentive struc-
ture has to be carefully checked. If a private firm antici-
Cf. Wright/Williams (1985).19
pate that it cannot dispose freely of its stock in periods of
embargoes, the incentive for building up a stock will lessen.
A market solution should be prefered.
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